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interpreting the landmark 1994 ruling in Dolan v. City of Tigard, recent cases interpreting
the Supreme Court's "rough proportionality" test are harder to find
than Waldo®. 2 Among decisions through the first quarter of 1998, there
are no interpretations of Dolan's requirement of an approximate mathematical correlation between a development exaction and the impact of
development. Beyond dicta from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, 3 there is also little evidence of an advance in the CaliforFOLLOWING A THREE-YEAR FLURRY OF DECISIONS
1

l. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). For discussion of Dolan and subsequent federal and
state case law, see generally Jonathan Davidson & Adam U. Lindgren, Nollan/Dolan,
Show Me the Findings!, 29 URB. LAW .. 427 (1997); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Jonathan
M. Davidson & Adam U. Lindgren, Nollan/Dolan: The Emerging Wing in Regulatory
Takings Analysis, 28 URB. LAW .. 789 (1996); and Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Jonathan
M. Davidson, Life After Dolan: Review of the Cases, 27 URB. LAw .. 874 (1995).
2. This is a reference to the popular comic and puzzles, Where's Waldo®?, created
by Martin Handford.
3. See Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.
1997), discussed infra at notes 62 to 66 and accompanying text.
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nia/ Arizona view that legislatively adopted exactions programs fall
beyond the reach of this test. Rather, cases over the past year are
most notable for drawing distinctions from Dolan's factual and legal
applicability. Amid the unanticipated litigation lull, this annual report
reflects on the current state of exactions case law and considers the
potential impact of federal constitutional developments on local ordinance drafting.
I. Post-Dolan Exactions Law: A Roughly

Proportional Status Report

When Dolan v. City of Tigard first added the as-applied element to
the ''nexus'' requirement established by Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 4 litigators and commentators5 struggled to decipher when,
where, and how the rough proportionality test would apply. The 1987
Nollan decision established that there must be a linkage between a
development exaction and a legitimate state interest. 6 Once this Nollan
''nexus'' test is met, Dolan brought on a second tier of inquiry in
1994: the relationship between specific land-use permit conditions and
anticipated impacts of the proposed development requiring that this
correlation reflect a measure of intensity that is roughly proportional. 7
Prior to this year's pause in reported cases, courts have applied Dolan 's
standard of rough proportionality with varied levels of scrutiny. Georgia's determination that the test does not apply to landscaping requirements for parking lots was denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 8 Prevalently, courts invoking the test have deferred to local
planning analysis and findings provided there is evidence of supporting
analysis and individualized findings. 9 A more inventive interpretation
4. 483 u.s. 825 (1987).
5. See, e.g., DavidS. Ardia, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Takings Doctrine Moves
Onto Unpaved Ground, 24 REAL EsT. L.J. 195 (1996); John Delaney, What Does It
Take to Make a Take? A Post-Dolan Look at the Evolution of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court, 27 URB. LAw .. 55, 69 (1995); James H. Freis,
Jr. & Stefan V. Reyniak, Putting Takings Back into the Fifth Amendment: Land Use
Planning After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 21 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 103 (1996); Nancy
E. Stroud & Susan L. Trevarthen, Defensible Exactions After Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 STETSON L. REv. 593 (1996); Daniel
A. Crane, Comment, A Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings After Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 199 (1996).
6. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
7. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
8. See Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S. E.2d 200 (Ga.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995) (ordinance with specific landscaping
requirements for parking lots not subject to review under the "rough proportionality"
test of Dolan).
9. See, e.g., F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (nexus for road improvements exaction need not be mathematically precise); Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810-11
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of rough proportionality is evidenced in the Illinois appellate decision
in Amoco Oil Company v. Village of Schaumberg. 10 That decision reversed a conditional rezoning after intensive scrutiny of local planning
and engineering reports. 11 The Oregon appellate court in Art Piculell
Group v. Clackamas County12 went so far as to overturn the local
hearing officer's specific fact-finding on the location of water, sewage,
and drainage pipes as part of its rough proportionality inquiry into road
dedication conditions attached to subdivision approval. 13
Federal and state judiciaries have also grappled with questions of the
timing and applicability of the Dolan test. Clearly, the factual context of
Dolan would make conditions attached to individual land development
permits within its purview. 14 The rough proportionality test has also
been applied to dedications and exactions linked to subdivision approvals, 15 rezoning, 16 and annexation. 17 Outside the direct land-use context,
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (deferring to town's individualized determination in sustaining
a scenic and conservation easement's purposes and application); Sparks v. Douglas
County, 904 P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1995), rev'g, Sparks v. Douglas County, 863
P.2d 142 (Wash. App. 1993) (sustaining required dedication of rights-of-way for road
improvements where county had documented existing road deficiencies and had calculated increase in traffic and the specific need for dedications based upon impacts of
the proposed subdivisions).
10. 661 N.E.2d 380, 382-84 (Ill. App. 1995). While Illinois has a long-established
test for exactions requiring that the impacts be specifically and uniquely attributable
to the exaction, see Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mt. Prospect, 176 N. E. 2d 799
(Ill. 1961), the Schaumberg court clarified that it was deciding this matter under the
Dolan rough proportionality test for federal constitutionality. 661 N.E.2d at 387,
n. 5.

11. Schaumberg, 661 N .E.2d at 392-93. The invalidated conditions required dedication of approximately 20% of the property for road improvements to reconstruct a
convenience store with gas pumps. /d.
12. 922 P.2d 1227 (Or. App. 1996).
13. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d at 1234. This decision stated that "a single
erroneous finding that plays a significant role in the government's effort to show rough
proportionality can in itself be the basis for reversing the government decision." /d.
at 1233. See also Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 310 (8th Cir. 1996)
(city's conditional rezoning requiring land dedication for expansion of adjacent highway
remanded in light of "sparsity of the record").
14. Dolan involved conditions placed on a development permit for expansion of
a hardware store including required dedications for a bikepath and flood way. Dolan,
512 U.S. at 377-82; cf Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (lOth Cir.
1995) (Wyoming wildlife management law limiting number of hunting licenses that
landowners could obtain for certain species distinguished Dolan as physical invasion
case).
15. See, e.g., Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227 (Or. App.
1996); Sparks v. Douglas County, 904 P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1995) (subdivision plat
approval); Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan Comm'n, 563 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1997)
(subdivision conditions).
16. See, e.g., Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306 (8th Cir. 1996) (conditions
attached to rezoning); Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumberg, 661 N.E.2d 380
(Ill. App. 1995) (conditions attached to a zoning application for a special use permit).
17. See Hoepker, 563 N .W.2d at 15l(invalidating subdivision condition requiring
municipal annexation).
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courts have considered the applicability of the test to housing preservation programs 18 and to the support of public art. 19
Substantial precedent also indicates that a legislative enactment imposing developer exactions may shield government from a Dolan-based
attack. 20 However, this legislative armor may be pierced once the exaction is administered on a case-by-case basis. In Ehrlich v. City of Culver
City/ 1 the California Supreme Court found Dolan inapplicable to a
generally applicable public art fee, 22 then invoked the rough proportionality test for a recreational impact fee as applied to a single property.
It then remanded that matter because that record was devoid of any
individualized findings. 23 The Arizona Scottsdale decision also distinguished Dolan when it sustained an ordinance adopting a water service
fee applicable to all new development at the building permit stage. 24
It is notable, though, that the Arizona court devoted a substantial portion
of its opinion to referencing supporting studies that addressed water
resource needs, methodologies for calculating fees, and the comprehensive program that led to enactment of the fee. 25
Responding to another potential extension of Dolan's impact, the
Washington State Supreme Court recently rejected a substantive due
process argument that the adjudicatory nature of environmental permit
issuance makes the rough proportionality takings test applicable. 26 In
particular, the court concluded that the holding in Dolan which required
shifting the burden of proof to the government to justify an exaction

18. See, e.g., Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d
562 (Cal. App. 1997); Arcadia Dev. v. City ofB1oomington, 552 N.W. 2d 281, 286
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (Dolan inapplicable to local ordinance requiring mobile home
park owners to pay relocation costs to displaced residents upon closing of the park);
Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 935 P.2d 555 (Wash. 1997) (concurring and dissenting
opinions).
19. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
20. See Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz.
1997) (Dolan does not apply to water service fee ordinance); Ehrlich v. City of Culver
City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (distinguishing recreation and public art fee ordinance
provisions from as-applied context); McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P .2d 836, 845
(Kan. 1995) (holding Dolan inapplicable to a municipal ordinance which conditioned
building permits and plat approval on payment of impact fees); Waters Landing L.P.
v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1995) (distinguishing Dolan in part
because development impact tax was legislative act).
21. 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
22. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 450.
23. /d. at 448.
24. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d at 995.
25. /d. at 997-1000.
26. Christianson v. Snohomish Health Dist., 946 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Wash. 1997),
concerned the denial of an environmental construction clearance permit for expansion
of a mountain cabin based on the adequacy of a septic system.
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did not automatically apply to other land-use adjudications. 27 The record
before the court reflected an extensive inquiry into applicable state
environmental regulations by the hearing examiner. 28 The Washington
court distinguished between substantive due process and takings law.
Here, the appellants did not argue that a property interest was deprived.
Moving on to substantive due process, the court found that the government purposes in the prevention of contamination of ground and surface
water quality if the substandard septic system were approved, were
adequate to meet this latter constitutional standard. 29
II. Regulatory Leveraging in the Land
Development Context: "I'm Not Dolan!"

Concern with governmental regulatory leveraging, consistent with directives of Nollan and Dolan, has been a focus of recent cases before
the Wisconsin and New Jersey Supreme Courts. Both cases involved
the constitutionality of conditions imposed on developmental approval
and addressed the fairness of allocating general community costs on
land developers and, consequently, newcomers to the locality. 30 Other
state and federal decisions involving subdivision approval conditions
in Washington indicate greater deference to governmental discretion.
However, none of these cases directly applies the rough proportionality
element of Dolan's constitutional test.
In Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan Commission/ 1 the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin considered the case of a sixty-two-unit residential
subdivision approval made subject to a series of conditions imposed
by the City of Madison. The landowners, the Hoepkers, sought review
on two of the conditions which required them: (1) to agree to a city
annexation of the land covered by the preliminary subdivision plat and
(2) to reconfigure their plat in order to provide for an open space
corridor. The lower Wisconsin courts had ruled that the city could not
condition plat approval on annexation, but that it could impose the open
27. ld. at 774.
28. ld. at771-72.
29. /d. at 777.
30. These decisions extend a theme present in constitutional theory at least since
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), that the Takings Clause "was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness, and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'' Imbedded
within this line of thought is an opposition, on constitutional terms, to "regulatory
leveraging" where government approval mechanisms are used to extort community
benefits from individual land owners.
31. City of Madison, 563 N.W.2d at 145.
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space corridor condition. However, the state's supreme court took a
different view.
On the first question, the City of Madison court held that the city
could not condition its subdivision plat approval on the annexation of
the parcel. The city had justified this requirement to ensure that the
full range of urban services could be provided to the development
in a timely fashion according to the city's "established regulations,
practices, policies, and procedures.' ' 32 While acknowledging the important public policy reasons for permitting development approval
based, in part, on agreement to annexation, the court rejected this
ground based on the inconsistency of the local requirement with state
annexation policy and standards set forth in Wisconsin statutes. 33 Thereafter, subdividers and localities may agree to annexation prior to the
granting of development approval, but that agreement must be voluntary.34
The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered next whether the city's
requiring an open space corridor be identified on the subdivision plat
and reserved for possible public acquisition for up to five years could
be a potential "temporary regulatory taking." The lower appellate
court had ruled that the Dolan precedent did not apply to the facts at
hand, because Dolan involved conditional development approval based
on the donation of land as opposed to the reservation of land in this
case. 35 In Madison, the owner was only required to delay use of the
land rather than convey it to the locality. 36 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court did not rely on this distinction in disposing of this issue. Rather,
the court determined that the plaintiff's taking claim was not yet ''ripe''
for decision since there was no final location of the open space corridor
and, therefore, no exact knowledge of regulatory impact on the landowner.37
While there has been no judgment on the merits, the Madison decision
is significant for raising the possibility that a condition imposing a
reservation or delay on the development of land could constitute a
taking even if for a temporary period. The Wisconsin court has merged
the ideas contained in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles38 with
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

!d. at 148.
!d. at 151.
!d.
!d. at 149.
City of Madison, 563 N.W.2d at 149.
!d. at 153.
482 u.s. 304 (1987).
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those in the Nollan and Dolan series of cases. City of Madison also
indicates that the wide use of the long-term reservation technique may
soon become the focus oflater cases. The fact that the local government
might eventually pay compensation for the open space corridor might
not save the reservation. However, significant analytical questions remain to be resolved in deciding such issues, including: what is the
relevant property interest being taken in the temporary taking situation;
what is the spillover effect of delaying development of the protected
parcel to the remaining land; and how would the ''rough proportionality" calculation of Dolan be applied in the temporary taking context?
In the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Swanson v. Planning
Board of the Township of Hopewel/, 39 a concurring opinion expresses
particular concern that the unrestricted imposition of exactions would
convert community planning into a nontransparent, case-by-case series
of freewheeling municipal/landowner deals. The Hopewell dispute
arose from the familiar setting of the conditional rezoning process where
a land developer sought a rezoning to allow a residential subdivision.
Negotiations between the land developer and the locality resulted in
an agreement where the landowner promised to pay up to $1.7 million
for the construction of a sewer pumping station and force main which
would serve not only the subdivider's 117 acre parcel but also the 121
existing homes in the adjacent Princeton Farms development. 40 The
legal challenge presented in this case originated from a citizen's attack
on the lawfulness of the subdivision approval pursuant to the earlier
agreement. 41
A concurring opinion by Judge Stein agreed with the court's refusal
to hear the matter, but added a strong statement supporting exaction
proportionality in the interest of preserving the integrity of public land
planning and regulatory processes. The concurrence framed the issue
as one of municipal authority: was this an illegal exaction unauthorized
by the laws of the state of New Jersey? The three justice opinion concluded that neither the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law nor the
local-improvements statute would have justified the imposition of disproportionate sewer improvement costs upon the land developer. 42
Although never explicitly mentioning either the Nollan or the Dolan
39. Hopewell, 692 A.2d 966 (1997).
40. Hopewell, 692 A.2d at 967. This agreement contained many provisions favorable to the developer's interest including a special provision immunizing the proposed
residential subdivision against future, otherwise applicable, changes in the existing
zoning ordinance design standards. /d.
41. /d. at 967.
42. /d. at 968.
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opinions, the New Jersey opinion emphasized that a subdivider could
only be compelled to supply the portion of an off-site improvement
cost which bears a rational nexus to the needs created by, and benefits
conferred upon, the subdivision. It then emphasized the need for predictability and judicial reviewability of exactions noting that the legislature had acted to ''circumscribe the power of planning boards by requiring that the power be exercised in conformity with standards set forth
by ordinance. " 43 The danger addressed by the court was not that unfair
exactions would be imposed on reluctant land developers, but rather
that local officials would have ''an impermissibly broad range of discretion in exacting off-site improvements.' ' 44 That is, municipal discretion
could be exercised in favor of property owners and developers willing
to subject themselves to monetary or land exactions.
This curious flip-side of the usual exaction case presents argument
for uniformity and limits as a means of regulating local government
dealmaking. As the opinion in Hopewell noted,
... the kind of free-wheeling bidding under review is grossly inimical to the goals
of sound land use regulation. The intolerable spectacle of a planning board haggling
with an applicant over money too strongly suggests that variances are up for sale.
This cannot be countenanced. Proceedings in which this has occurred are irremediably tainted and must be set aside. 45

The views expressed in the Hopewell concurrence portray exactions,
even if acquiesced to, as improper incentives impermissibly tainting
municipal actions on development applications.
In comparative deference to local discretion, an intermediate Washington appellate decision, Snider v. Board, 46 focused on a condition
for approval of a subdivision plat that would require government acquisition of a right-of-way from a third party rather than from the principal
property. 47 The court distinguished the factual context from Dolan because this contingency would require Walla Walia County to independently initiate eminent domain proceedings apart from its subdivision
control powers. 48 Here, Mr. Snider could not point to a direct infringement on his property as a basis for a takings claim. 49
In Macri v. King County, 50 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals de43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

/d. at 970.

Hopewell, 692 A.2d at 970.
/d.

Snider v. Board, 932 P.2d 704 (Wash. App. 1997).
/d. at 708-09.
/d. at 709.
/d. at 708.
126 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 1997).
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ferred to Washington State compensatory remedies in its dismissal of
a § 1983 action. In that case, the county had denied a preliminary plat
application because of inadequate access to the proposed eleven-unit
cul-de-sac subdivision. Ironically, the county hearing examiner's recommendation that was adopted relied on a general county ordinance
allowing denial of an application if provision is not made for ''the public
health, safety, and welfare," and rejected the planning department's
"informal 'rule of thumb' to generally limit the number of lots which
could be developed in an area with only one access road. " 51
III. Dolan and Housing Conversion ProgramsMore Exceptions to the Rule

Recent discussions of the applicability of the constitutional rough proportionality test focus on monetary exactions and compensation issues
in relation to housing programs. In Lambert v. City and County of San
Francisco, 52 the California intermediate appellate court averted Dolan
in reviewing provisions designed to protect existing residential hotel
units from conversion into more profitable tourist units. Following the
required San Francisco zoning procedures, owners of the Cornell Hotel
applied to the city's Planning Commission for a conditional use permit
to undertake a conversion of its residential units. 53 The Commission
denied the permit, finding that the proposed use was neither desirable
nor necessary, would be injurious to personal and property interests
in the neighborhood and the community, and would be inconsistent
with the policies and objectives of the city's Master Plan. This denial
resulted in the lawsuit challenging the city's action on the permit.
The California Court of Appeal analyzed the case from two perspectives. First, it concluded that neither the San Francisco Planning Code
nor the HCO effected a taking of property either on their face or as
applied to the specific elements of the Lambert case. In general, the
fact that the regulations furthered legitimate governmental interests and
did not deprive landowners of the economically viable use of their
51. Macri, 126F.3dat 1127.
52. 57 Cal. App. 4th 1172, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
53. At the outset the hotel contained 24 residential units and 34 tourist units. Under
relevant code provisions, a hotel owner desiring to convert existing residential hotel
units to tourist units must obtain both a conditional use permit under the planning
code and permission under San Francisco's Hotel Conversion Ordinance (HCO). City
permission to convert the units may be given only if the owner replaces the units or
agrees to pay the costs of constructing similar units. This latter requirement demanded
a one-to-one replacement for each converted unit. Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565,
57 Cal. App. 4th at 1175.
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property convinced the court to sustain the local government rules.
Along the same lines, the appellate panel ruled that the denial of the
conditional use permit did not constitute a taking either because Lambert
was attempting to secure approval to change the land use of the parcel,
and, therefore, had no property right to the requested change. In addition, the court found substantial evidence supporting the city's position
involving issues of affordable housing preservation, prevention of traffic congestion, and limited parking. These and other reasons justified
denial of the permit since they furthered legitimate governmental interests. 54
The appellate court sidestepped Lambert's central evidentiary contention that the City Planning Commission would have issued the conditional use permit if he had paid the city $600,000, representing the
cost of rebuilding an equal number of housing units being removed by
way of the hotel conversion. For hotel conversions, this one-to-one
replacement feature was imposed pursuant to the HCO and constituted
a prerequisite to the issuance of the conditional use permit. 55 Apparently
the court was aware of the troublesome constitutional character of the
housing replacement charge, but it chose to avoid the question by focusing upon the legitimate grounds for denying the conditional use permit.
While the California court recognized that the Nollan/Dolan line of
cases required a heightened standard of review, it concluded that such
scrutiny was not demanded in the case before it. Since Lambert's conditional use permit request was turned down solely on the basis of' 'legitimate'' local government planning factors, the court reasoned that it need
not consider the case under the Nollan/Dolan or Ehrlich constitutional
principles. A strongly worded dissenting opinion would have applied
the analysis from these case decisions and would have found for the
Lamberts. 56
The Lambert case represents an example of a court straining to avoid
considering the city's housing replacement policy in terms of a development condition or an exaction. The court even revealed a degree of
discomfort with its own position when it stated that,
[w]hile it is somewhat disturbing that San Francisco's concerns about congestion,
parking and preservation of a neighborhood might have been overcome by payment
of significant sum of money, the fact remains that San Francisco did not demand

54. /d. at567-72.
55. /d. at 572.
56. /d. at 573.
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anything from Lambert as a condition of a use permit. It simply denied the permit
outright. 57

This statement suggests a significant degree of inconsistency in the
court's holding-while it approved of the permit denial based on legitimate governmental concerns, it saw the city willing to waive those
important considerations upon the payment of a substantial fee. Such
a waivable policy induces skepticism about the reality of the suggested
public purposes supposedly being advanced by the ordinance. The decision ignores the explicit HCO one-to-one replacement requirement and
refuses to apply the prevailing and applicable constitutional analysis
to it. Such an unwillingness would seem to indicate a lack of confidence
in the constitutionality of the provision. With review granted by the
California Supreme Court, these issues are likely to be resolved.
An analogous debate between concurring and dissenting Washington
State Supreme Court justices transpired over whether Dolan's rough
proportionality test should be applied to Seattle's rescinded Housing
Preservation Ordinance. The majority opinion in Sintra, Inc. v. City
ofSeattle58 rested on the issue of the applicability of interest and punitive
damage awards under Seattle's former Housing Preservation Ordinance.59 However, a concurring opinion by Chief Judge Durham60 took
specific issue with a dissent by Judge Talmadge, who would apply
Dolan to the monetary damage measure of the ordinance's impact on
the property owner. 61
A federal Ninth Circuit ruling also rejected the applicability of Dolan's heightened scrutiny to an ordinance providing for conversion of
leasehold interests in condominium units into fee interests. Richardson
v. City and County ofHonolulu 62 addressed this unique law and regulations, which offered eminent domain compensation for affected property owners. The federal appellate court rejected the argument that the
ordinance should be subject to the rough proportionality test. 63
The majority decision in Honolulu distinguished the ordinance at
issue, which incorporated an eminent domain procedure to compensate
landowners affected by the condominium conversions, from a regula-

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

/d. at 569.
935 P.2d 555 (Wash. 1997).
/d. at 558.
/d. at 570-74 (Durham, C.J., concurring).
/d. at 578-82 (Talmadge, J., dissenting in part).
124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997).
Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1153.
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tory takings context where compensation is not anticipated. 64 It determined that continued deference to legislative enactment, as affirmed
in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 65 remains the applicable law. 66
IV. Dolan's Impact on Drafting Local
Exaction and Impact Fee Ordinances:
A Public Agency Practical Perspective

One major lesson derived from Nollan!Dolan and their decisional progeny is that public agencies, particularly cities and counties, 67 must draft
with greater care local ordinances that impose exactions and development impact fees. 68 Adequate comprehensive plans69 and capital im64. /d. at 1157-58.
65. 467 u.s. 229 (1984).
66. Richardson, 124 F. 3d at 1157-60. A dissenting opinion suggests that the LucasNolan-Dolan trio should be extended to allow heightened scrutiny of compensatory
regulation ordinances. /d. at 1166-68 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting in part).
67. Although Nollan involved the imposition of an exaction (access easement dedication) by a state agency, the preponderance of case law in this constitutional fray
embraces legislative and adjudicative action taken by cities and counties. For background, see J. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 6.08
(1997).
68. For acknowledgment of this view from public and private sector quarters, see
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Takings in the Land-Use Arena after Lucas and Dolan: How
Far Is Too Far in Imposing Exactions?, in TAKINGS-LAND-DEVELOPMENT CoNDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AITER DOLAN AND LUCAS 83, 103 (D. Callies,
ed. 1996) (public sector view); and Bley, Dolan: Ramifications for Developers, 4
CAL. LAND UsE & ENV'T FoRUM 85, 88 (Spring 1995) (private sector view). From
a state statutory perspective, Arizona expressly requires cities, towns and counties to
comply with the Nollan/Dolan cases, see 3A ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 9-500.13,
11-810 (West Supp. 1997). Regulatory takings in the Nollan/Dolan area are classified
as a "title take," as opposed to a "physical occupation take" or an "economic take."
For discussion of this doctrinal classification of regulatory takings, see Robert H.
Freilich & Elizabeth Garvin, Takings after Lucas: Growth Management, Planning,
and Regulatory Implementation Will Work Better Than Before, in AITER LucAs:
LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION
53, 54-61 (D. Callies, ed. 1993) (defining a "title take" as "a restriction on the use
of property that significantly interferes with the incidents of ownership"; a "physical
take'' as ''a physical occupation authorized by government''; and an ''economic take''
as "the failure of a regulation to advance a legitimate state interest [or] the absence
of any permanent [economic] value remaining for the property taken as a whole").
A "title take" has a better chance of being recognized in court because of the comparatively stricter constitutional standards with which public agencies must comply to
survive a ''title take.'' See generally John J. Delaney, What Does It Take to Make a
Take? A Post- Dolan Look at the Evolution of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence in the
Supreme Court, 27 URB. LAW. 55, 69 (1995) (arguing that regulatory exactions (e.g.,
conveyance/dedication of property and development impact fees) will be subjected to
"higher than minimal scrutiny, with the burden of proof being upon the government
instead of the property owner").
69. See Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek, Public Improvements and the
Nexus Factor: The Takings Equation after Dolan v. City of Tigard, in EXACTIONS,
IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS 3, 13-14 (R. Freilich & D. Bushekeds., 1995) [herein-
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provement programs70 can be viewed as twin pillars of a rationally
based exaction and impact fee ordinance. The absence of either or both
of these bases can expose the ordinance itself, or its implementation
for a site-specific development project, to a Nollan/Dolan constitutional
attack. 71
Consequently, in a figurative sense, public agencies can obtain substantial constitutional insurance by taking the time to pay the premiums
for adequate land-use, environmental, and engineering planning that
documents the public needs and impacts that are intended to be
addressed by a local exaction and impact fee ordinance. 72 In this way,
defenders of an ordinance or development decision can refer the court
to the planning and programming studies that provide the extended
rationale for the imposition of exactions and impact fees.
In connection with preparing an exaction or impact fee ordinance, 73
the drafter should ( 1) identify the purpose of the exaction/impact fee;
(2) demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the exaction/impact
after "EXACTIONS") and Davidson, Concurrency, Cost Allocation, and Comprehensiveness in Adequate Public Facilities Regulations, in 1992 ZoNING & PLANNING LAw
HANDBOOK 283, 292-99 (K. Young ed.).
70. See Morgan, Duncan, McClendon & Standerfer, Impact Fee Ordinances: A
Guide to Legal Requirements and Administrative Standards, in 1987 ZONING & PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 275, 293-302 (N. Gordon ed.).
71. Likely grounds for challenge include that there is no rational basis for the
ordinance or there is no reasonable relationship (essential nexus) between the project
condition (exaction/impact fee) and the impact to be mitigated by that condition.
72. Robert H. Freilich & Terry D. Morgan, Municipal Strategies for Imposing
Valid Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan, in EXACTIONS, supra note 69,
at 21, 27-31.
73. As a practical matter, the drafter of the local exaction/impact fee legislation
must come to grips with certain fundamentals, which include, but are not limited to,
the following:
SECTION 1, Exaction/Impact Fee Ordinance (Short Title, Findings, Intent, Authority,
Definitions, Applicability of Exaction/Impact Fee, Imposition of Exaction/Impact
Fee, Establishment of Development Subareas, Development Potential by Subarea,
Capital Improvement Program by Subarea, Impact Fee Coefficients by Subarea,
Administration of Exaction/Impact Fee, Bonding of Excess Facility Project, Refunds, Appeals, Effect of Exaction/Impact Fee on Zoning and Subdivision Regulations, Exaction/Impact Fee as Additional and Supplemental Requirement, Variances
and Exceptions, and Credits);
SECTION 2, Liberal Construction;
SECTION 3, Repealer;
SECTION 4, Severability; and
SECTION 5, Effective Date.
For an excellent discussion of this type of ordinance, see Leitner & Strauss, A Municipal
Impact Fee Ordinance, Based on the Standard Development Impact Fee Enabling
Statute, with Commentary, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES: POLICY RATIONALE, PRACTICE, THEORY & IssuEs 142 (A. Nelson ed., 1988). See also Martin L. Leitner &
Susan P. Shoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling Legislation, 25 URB. LAW.
491 (1993).
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fee and the purpose for which it is imposed; (3) identify all sources
and amounts of funding anticipated to complete financing of incomplete
public improvements; (4) designate the approximate dates on which
such funds are expected to be deposited into the appropriate fund or
account; and (5) direct that such funds be deposited into a separate
account for the identified impact fee. 74
When drafting the legislative findings demonstrating the reasonable
relationship between exaction/impact fee and the purpose for which it
is imposed, it is critical that the findings not be conclusory. Instead,
the findings should articulate specific facts that justify the need for the
exaction or the impact fee and should refer to land-use, environmental,
and engineering reports designed to document the justification for the
exaction/impact fee. One should avoid the temptation to cluster the
discussion of the reasonable relationship between the exaction/impact
fee and the purpose for which it is charged with several different exactions/impact fees. Isolate the findings discussion for each exaction/
impact fee. This will avoid confusion in the adoption process, as well
as in the judicial process, if necessary .75 Finally, a public hearing, even
if not mandatory before adoption, should be held to give reasonable
notice and opportunity for community input to the proposed exaction/
impact fee ordinance.
V. Reflections on the Current Quiet:
Issues Resolved or Icebergs Ahead?

In this smooth-sailing year, it may be prudent to survey explanations
for the relative absence of reported cases addressing the scope and
application of Nollan and Dolan's developing federal constitutional law
of exactions. First, it is possible that few litigants are seeking to challenge municipal and other local government development exaction practices because they believe that those practices comply with the constitutional parameters of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions and that legal
attack would be costly and futile. Improved local government documentation of the costs of development may also deter potential plaintiffs
74. These components are derived from California legislation. See, e.g., CAL.
Gov'T CoDE§§ 66000, et seq. (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). See also David L. Callies,
Dolan v. City of Tigard: One Year Later, 4 CAL. LAND UsE & ENV'T FoRUM 79, 84
(Spring 1995) (suggesting, in part, that local government must "develop defensible
quantification measures" for the exactions imposed). For an example of state enabling
legislation that shows how to quantify development impact fees, see Idaho Code §§
67-8201 et seq. (Michie Supp. 1997).
75. For further discussion on drafting findings, see Michael C. Spata, Project
Exactions and the Nollan Case, APA SAN DIEGO PLAN. J. 5, 6 (Feb. 1989). See also
Jonathan M. Davidson & Adam U. Lindgren, Nollan/Dolan, Show Me the Findings!, 29
URB. LAW. 427 (1997).
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from challenging the governmental unit. If the amount of the exaction
is relatively certain and underlying methodologies are clearly demarked, the regulated party may conclude that a challenge is not costeffective. Especially with regard to financial exactions, the incorporation of these costs into project sales prices might restrain the desire to
litigate the constitutional validity of the exaction.
In some jurisdictions, the absence of reported exaction cases might
also herald the development of new governmental techniques achieving
the same purposes as exactions. For instance, financial development
charges may be characterized as excise taxes or privilege taxes. 76 Other
localities may rely to a greater degree on the use of nonproperty transfer
techniques such as setback and buffer zones to provide for land preservation and protection without a land exaction.
Conversely, there may be a chilling effect on assertive or expansive
exactions by governments wary of federal constitutional challenges.
The prospect of defending a takings challenge based on alleged temporary or permanent infringements may lead to increased capitulation,
or perhaps to a negotiated development that is more compromising
than that initially proposed by planning staff. The element of state
compensatory remedies, emboldened by the Dolan ruling, may also
temper required dedications or monetary exaction demands.
Finally, potential challengers could believe that although local government exaction methods violate the rules set out in the Nollan and
Dolan cases, resorting to the state court remedies would be unproductive due to those courts' reluctance to interpret expansively the sweep
of the cases. State courts may ignore federal constitutional holdings
in their opinions and rely on state law principles to rule on the same
issues. However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency77 does appear to establish federal grounds for
ripeness of takings claims short of exhausting all local (or state) administrative remedies. Whether or not this ripeness portends impending titanic clashes over government exactions, it is logical to surveil the
stillness in case law for timely detection of submerged issues. 78

76. Telephone Interview with David W. Bushek, Attorney with Stinson, Mag, &
Fizzell, Kansas City, Mo. (Apr. 21, 1998).
77. 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) (holding that property owner did not need to exhaust
remedies through transferable development rights program for takings claim to be
ripe).
78. See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd. v. City of Monterrey, 95 F.3d
1422, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court jury verdict and temporary
damage award of $1.450 million for extensive conditions placed on subdivision application for 37.6 acres of oceanfront property), cen. granted, Monterrey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd., 60 U.S.L.W. 3635 (Mar. 31, 1998).

